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Auditor Choice in Italian Non-Listed Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   In the academic literature, we can identify two main approaches to explaining the drivers of 
auditor choice. The first approach focuses on the reduction in information risk that accrues as 
an audit leads to more reliable reporting. Firms with higher agency costs are inclined to 
choose a high-quality auditor in order to strengthen their corporate governance and thereby 
alleviate potential agency conflicts (e.g. Francis et al., 1999; Gul and Tsui, 2001; Krishnan, 
2003; Mansi et al., 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005; Knechel et al., 2008; Lin and Liu, 2009; 
Mahdavi et al., 2011; Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, 2011). The second approach 
(e.g. Kneckel 2002; Kneckel et al., 2008; Liu and Lai, 2012) argues that high quality auditing 
also improves the operational efficiency and effectiveness of a firm through the evaluation of 
its internal processes, deterrence against management malfeasance, and increased compliance 
with legal and regulatory constraints. In this paper, we attempt to synthesize the two 
approaches by developing a model of the determinants of auditor choice in non-listed firms 
which incorporates variables proxying for both agency conflict and organizational 
complexity effects. 
   The EC Green Paper on Corporate Governance (EC, 2011) proposes the introduction of an 
Independent Professional Supervisory Board (IPSB) for SMEs (Zanardi, 2010), akin to the 
Italian Board of Statutory Auditors, as a corporate governance mechanism for listed and non-
listed European SMEs (OEC, 2010; Zanardi, 2010). The Paper (EC, 2011, p. 4) highlights 
that proper and efficient governance is also valuable for non-listed companies, especially 
taking into account the economic importance of such firms. Such firms are of particular 
importance in countries with less developed capital markets where the vast majority of firms 
are not listed on a stock exchange or regulated market. Even in more developed economies, 
most small and medium-sized enterprises are not listed. According to the OECD (2004), 
improved corporate governance within non-listed firms has the potential to significantly 
boost productivity growth and job creation in both developed and developing economies 
(Ecoda, 2010). Moreover, the OECD (2015, p. 10) highlights that a “credible corporate 
governance framework, supported by effective supervision and enforcement mechanisms, 
will help improve the confidence of domestic investors, reduce the cost of capital, underpin 
the good functioning of financial markets, and ultimately induce more stable sources of 
financing”. However, despite their abundance and economic importance, the governance of 
non-listed firms is an often neglected area in corporate governance studies. 
   The OECD (2015, p. 11) further points out that the usefulness of the disclosed information 
in non-listed firms “…often depends on the experience and quality of the auditors”. It posits 
that in non-listed firms both corporate governance and auditing are relevant concerns. The 
Chartered Accountants of Italy, Spain and France signed a document that supports this 
proposal (OEC, 2010). Therefore, the Italian context is of significant interest and relevance in 
the wider international context, due to the particularity of the Italian auditing and corporate 
governance environment that allows non-listed firms to be audited by the BSA, an 
independent statutory committee consistent with the ‘traditional’ model of corporate 
governance adopted by the vast majority of Italian firms (Mariani et al., 2010). Thus, for such 
firms, the BSA competes with external auditors in the market for auditing services. The role 
of an internal and independent professional auditing body such as the Italian Board of 
Statutory Auditors (the Collegio Sindacale) with administrative, and also potentially 
financial, auditor skills may address agency problems within a company. In the context of 
market globalization, corporate governance has gradually become more significant as a 
concern for small and medium-size entities as improvement here can increase 
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competitiveness. Strengthening the governance structure is also a means to augmenting 
strategic management within such firms. Therefore, aspects of the corporate governance 
system for Italian firms may be useful to inform the wider EU debate on a corporate 
governance system for European (listed and) non-listed firms. More specifically, the 
administration and control system for Italian firms has proved to be a valid and effective 
model in general, and in particular in moments of crisis (ICG, 2011, p. 2). This system is 
based on the work of the general shareholders’ meeting which has the power to pass 
resolutions, the board of directors (BoD) which conducts management duties, and the 
‘collegio sindacale’ (an independent professional supervisory board or statutory committee, 
regulated by Italian company law, which includes professional auditors among its members) 
as the control body within the company’s governance structure. The clear distinction between 
management (attributed exclusively to the BoD) and control (attributed to the BSA) is a 
fundamental feature of the model which aims to ensure, on one hand, freedom of choice in 
the operations necessary for the conducting of business activities and, on the other hand, to 
provide a continuous monitoring of these choices in relation to compliance with the law and 
the principles of correct administration, and in relation to the suitability of the organizational, 
administrative and accounting system and its correct functioning (ICG, 2011). Thus, focusing 
on the Italian context provides an important benchmark model for consideration in the wider 
international (and especially European) context.  
   The existing literature concerning auditor choice in non-listed firms (e.g. Carey et al., 2000; 
Chaney et al., 2004; Lennox, 2005; Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Broye and Weill, 2008; 
Knechel et al., 2008; Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, 2011) shows results that vary 
across countries given different legal systems and degrees of investor/stakeholder protection.  
   Our motivation for studying auditor choice in non-listed firms in an Italian setting is as 
follows. First, most firms in Europe (and also in Italy) are non-listed firms with both family 
ownership and governance (Iacovone, 2015, Ecoda, 2010). Indeed, at the end of 2014 only 
342 firms  out to about 4.45 million were listed on the Italian Stock Exchange (Italian Stock 
Exchange, 2014). Moreover, approximatively 99.9% of Italian firms are smaller in size, and 
about the 94.4% of them are micro-sized (EC, 2013). Finally, 85% of these firms are family-
owned (AIDAF, 2015; Osservatorio AUB, 2014). In theory, family ownership reduces 
potential manager-shareholder agency problems, and thus reduces the need for high quality 
financial information (Wang, 2006) and auditing. Secondly, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find 
that (family and non-family) non-listed firms are more likely than listed firms to 
communicate privately with their stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, creditors, employees, 
suppliers), thereby reducing the demand for financial reporting quality. Non-listed firms are 
thus likely to substitute private communication for (public) financial reporting to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and other parties (e.g. lenders, shareholders, 
customers). As a consequence, higher quality financial statements are demanded more by 
listed firms than by non-listed firms. 
   The literature also demonstrates that the choice of an auditor by the smallest (non-listed) 
firms is driven mostly by firm complexity, that is, the need for strengthening internal control 
(Kneckel et al., 2008; Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, 2011). This means that the 
higher the complexity of the firm the greater the need for a high quality auditor in order to 
monitor firm complexity and operations. Inside the ‘traditional’ corporate governance model 
of Italian (listed and non-listed) firms, the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), that is a 
statutory committee engaged at the shareholders’ meeting, considers among other factors the 
appropriateness of the procedures adopted by management in pursuing the objectives of the 
firm, and operates on a day-by-day basis (the administrative auditing function as discussed in 
section 2). Therefore, it is argued that an Italian non-listed firm, which requires its financial 
statements to be audited, is more likely to engage the statutory committee as financial auditor 
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as such firms typically do not derive net benefits from engaging an external (high quality) 
auditor. Moreover, external audit companies tend to charge higher audit fees, commensurate 
with their reputational and industry specialization attributes (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2003; Choi 
et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008), thus reducing the net benefit for a non-listed firm to 
have its financial statements audited by an external auditor (whether Big 4 or otherwise). 
Finally, our study contributes to the debate detailed in the EC Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance (EC, 2011). Our results show that an increase in board independence leads to an 
increase in the likelihood that a firm will engage an external auditor, the only agency factor 
we find to be significant. Surprisingly, family ownership concentration is not a significant 
determinant. From an organizational complexity and risk perspective, subsidiaries, larger 
firms, and firms with a larger investment in inventories have a greater likelihood of engaging 
an external auditor, whereas firms with greater complexity and higher receivables have a 
lower likelihood due to the role of a BSA in mitigating organizational complexity. Finally, 
we find that legal form plays a moderate role, whereby firms incorporated as a stock 
company are more likely to engage an external auditor, as are firms voluntarily adopting 
IFRS. Therefore, our findings suggest that agency issues and organizational firm complexity 
and risk at least partially explain the auditor choice in Italian non-listed firms.  
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the Italian 
auditing environment. In section 3 we review the existing literature on auditor choice. We 
then explain the research design and methodology employed to develop the auditor choice 
model in section 4. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics for key model variables and goes 
on to analyze our empirical results. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Italian Auditing Environment 
 
The Italian auditing environment is something of a special case compared to other European 
auditing regimes. While listed firms may be audited only by an external auditor, a Big 4 firm 
or otherwise, non-listed firms may instead choose to be audited by a Board of Statutory 
Auditors. Here we provide some context on the Italian auditing environment in order to 
understand the role of these statutory auditors.   
   Since 1998 there have been a series of legislative changes to the Italian auditing system. 
The ‘Draghi Law’ (Legislative Decree 24 February 1998, No. 58) was instituted in that year 
to separate the administrative audit from the financial audit in both listed and non-listed 
firms. The administrative auditors have to respect both laws and corporate by-laws, attend to 
the principles of correct management, and consider the appropriateness of the procedures 
adopted by management in pursuing the objectives of the firm. In addition, the administrative 
auditors are responsible for verifying the adequacy of the organizational structure of the firm, 
its internal auditing system, and its administrative accounting system. The auditors conduct 
the duties assigned to them in compliance with the law and the Governance Code. More 
specifically, the administrative auditors monitor and critically appraise the decisions adopted 
by the management of a firm, by, for example, participating in the meetings of the Board of 
Directors. Administrative auditors have to report their opinion to the annual shareholders’ 
meeting on the ‘correctness’ of a firm’s operations and the behaviour of its management. 
   In contrast, the financial auditors have to certify the correctness of the bookkeeping entries 
and the financial reporting of management operations in order to verify that the accounts are 
maintained appropriately, and that ultimately the annual reports give a true and fair view of 
the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of the company. Further, they 
supervise the financial disclosure process, the efficacy of the internal control systems, the 
internal auditing and risk management of the firm, the auditing of the annual accounts and of 
the consolidated accounts, and the independence of the external auditor (when appointed by 
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the firm as financial auditor). The financial auditors comply both with Italian law and with 
International Standards on Auditing, and their work culminates in the issuance of the auditing 
report which provides an opinion on the reliability of the financial statements. 
   Following the Corporate Reform Law of 2003, the Italian Civil Code sets out three 
alternative models of corporate governance: traditional, monistic and dualistic, though the 
traditional model is that most used by Italian firms (Mariani et al., 2010). Under the 
‘traditional’ model, which provides the focus for this paper, two bodies are appointed by the 
shareholders. The first is the Board of Directors (BoD) who are responsible for the 
management of the firm. The second is the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), a mandatory 
body in charge of administrative auditing in all stock corporations as well as in all limited 
liability companies with equity exceeding €120,000. The BSA is appointed for a term of 
three years, and consists of three to five independent, professional members whose skills and 
responsibilities are clearly set out in law. Members must participate in all meetings of both 
the Board of Directors and the shareholders in order to monitor the activities of the former 
and to ensure that no fraud or illegal acts occur. The activities of the BSA also extend to 
monitoring the internal control system of the firm, thereby representing at least some 
protection for stakeholders against managerial excess and ultimately firm failure. The system 
is based on a clear distinction between the administrative function (which concerns the 
management of the firm) and the internal control function (which concerns the BSA). This 
therefore ensures the continuous supervision of the management by an independent body 
which is both highly qualified and furnished with significant powers of intervention in order 
to protect the interests of both firm insiders and outsiders. 
   The requirements for the statutory auditors (BSA) are that they: (i) should be strictly 
independent; (ii) must act exclusively in the interests of the firm; (iii) are selected from an 
Official Register of Auditors maintained by the Italian Minister of Justice, which is 
composed of professionals (Chartered Accountants) with a qualification in auditing, 
managers of complex enterprises with at least three years’ experience, as well as university 
professors of law or economics; and (iv) are required to have advanced professional skills 
and knowledge in the fields of accounting, auditing, finance, management and/or taxation.  
   Since 2003, the financial audit of Italian non-listed firms can be conducted by an external 
auditor or by the BSA. Table 1 provides further details of auditor requirements by type of 
company and corporate governance model. In particular, article 2409-bis of the Italian Civil 
Code specifies that stock or public companies (PCs) should in the first instance be audited by 
an external auditor (that is, the legal non-mandatory auditing system required for stock or 
public companies). Alternatively, the general shareholder meeting for such firms may decide 
to assign the financial auditing to the BSA. In this case, the BSA is in charge of both 
administrative and financial auditing. Further, art. 2477 of the Italian Civil Code specifies 
that all limited liability companies (Llcs) with equity exceeding €120,000, should in the first 
instance be audited by the BSA (that is, the legal non-mandatory auditing system required for 
Llcs). In this case, the BSA is in charge of both administrative and financial auditing. 
Alternatively, the general shareholder’s meeting may decide to assign the financial auditing 
to an external auditor. The consequence of this apparently confusing regime is that any Italian 
non-listed firm may decide to assign their financial auditing to either the BSA or to an 
external auditor (Big 4 or otherwise firm). The administrative and auditing fees of the 
statutory auditors are defined at the shareholders’ meeting or by the firm’s by-laws (art. 2402 
of Italian Civil Code). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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   In this paper we focus on the auditor choice of ‘Type 2’ companies, that is, non-listed stock 
companies and limited liability firms (limited liability firms cannot be listed in Italy) that are 
not publicly accountable, and are not obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements. 
Therefore, these firms have the choice of engaging either a BSA or an external auditor as 
financial auditor. 
   When the BSA is also appointed as financial auditor, it conducts both the administrative 
and financial auditing for a firm. Italian law prescribes to the members of the BSA the same 
level of independence as that enjoyed by external auditors. The Draghi Law both set out and 
reinforced the duties of the BSA more clearly, granting it the power to report any serious 
management irregularities to the Court. 
   In sum, the BSA is a multi-faceted, qualified and independent statutory body which 
represents a distinctive feature of the Italian traditional corporate governance model (Melis, 
2004). Further, the BSA exerts pervasive power within the firm, in so doing protecting the 
shareholders by preventing fraud and monitoring the firm’s operations. With regard to its 
performance of the control function, it should be noted that the BSA has the power and 
indeed the obligation to take part in company meetings, to convene its own meetings every 
90 days or more frequently if desired, as well as to acquire from and exchange information 
with the directors, with the external auditor and with the controlling body of group 
companies. Furthermore, the shareholders may themselves report any irregularities directly to 
the BSA, thereby triggering a specific control activity (Art. 2409 Italian Civil Code). The 
BSA therefore places itself at the centre of a continuous flow of corporate information which 
enables it, both on its own initiative as a control body and through cooperation with other 
corporate bodies, to carefully monitor company management. As a consequence, the clear 
distinction between management (attributed exclusively to the BoD) and control (attributed to 
a BSA) is a fundamental feature of the Italian “traditional” model of corporate governance. 
Thus model aims to ensure, on one hand, freedom of the choice of operations necessary for 
the carrying on of business activities and, on the other hand, continuous monitoring of these 
choices to ensure compliance with the law, the principles of correct administration, and the 
suitability of the organisational, administrative and accounting system as well as its correct 
functioning.  
   In general, external auditors are considered to be of higher quality when compared to the 
BSA. The Italian literature on audit quality (e.g. Mariani et al., 2010; Cameran and Prencipe, 
2011) finds that a BSA provides a lower level of audit quality (measured by the magnitude of 
earnings management, which is higher in absolute value) than an external auditor, although 
Bisogno (2012) finds no evidence of this in manufacturing firms. Such evidence does not 
mean that a BSA is in any sense a ‘worse’ auditor, as Italian law requires BSA members to 
have high level professional skills. 
 
3. Auditor Choice in Non-Listed Firms 
 
3.1. Determinants of Auditor Choice in Non-Listed Firms 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the external auditing of financial statements 
provides a partial solution to the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control within organisations. Moreover, auditors play a fundamental corporate governance 
role as they certify the validity of the financial statements (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In 
this context, agency costs may be reduced by subjecting the financial information to 
verification by a third party before provision to the providers of finance. The latter are then 
able to employ that audited information to assess the risk of the firm, and lenders are able to 
write debt covenants based upon it. Agency theory suggests a link between auditor quality 
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and information asymmetry reduction (Dechow et al., 2010). Auditor choice studies start 
from the proposition that the demand for high quality audit arises from the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Carey et al., 2000; Chaney et al., 2004; Broye 
and Weill, 2008; Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, 2011). Thus, prior research uses 
agency theory to at least partially explain auditor choice (e.g. Carey et al., 2000). In the most 
narrow sense, the basic role of the audit is to improve the quality of the firm’s financial 
statements, and there is significant evidence that a high quality audit reduces the incidence of 
earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Knechel et al., 2008).  
   The literature further suggests that the demand for quality auditing depends on more than 
simply a cost of capital argument (Abdel-khalik, 1993; Knechel, 2002; Knechel et al., 2008) 
since an audit can support managers in improving the efficiency of a firm or in removing the 
information asymmetries in internal reporting through the evaluation of firm internal 
processes, deterrence against management malfeasance, and increased compliance with legal 
and regulatory constraints (Kneckel, 2002; Kneckel et al., 2008; Liu and Lai, 2012). In 
essence, the literature suggests that organizational complexity is associated with greater 
information asymmetry (e.g., Simunic and Stein, 1997; Bushman et al., 2004; Demirkan et 
al., 2011). Consistent with Kneckel et al. (2008), our study extends the existing literature on 
the determinants of auditor choice by examining whether the information asymmetry arising 
from organizational complexity affects the demand of complex firms for higher quality 
auditors.  
   If this is the case, an effective administrative auditor (such as the Italian BSA) positioned 
inside the corporate governance model adopted by the firm may reduce the organizational 
complexity of the firm, even if a BSA is considered a ‘lower’ (financial) auditor compared to 
external auditors. Considering that the financial statements of (family and non-family) non-
listed firms, when compared to listed firms, are not scrutinized as much by investors, 
financial analysts or others (e.g. they are not examined at all by stock exchange regulating 
authorities), non-listed firms most likely have less interest in engaging high quality auditors 
to provide high quality information to outsiders. Thus, it is argued that, given its 
administrative auditing role, a BSA is capable of addressing both the agency and 
organizational problems facing non-listed firms. 
   A considerable number of studies examining factors affecting auditor choice focus on firm-
specific characteristics including firm size, leverage, and business complexity (e.g. Copley 
and Douthett, 2002; Broye and Weill, 2008; Knechel et al., 2008). Other studies investigate 
the influence of corporate disclosure (Lee et al., 2003), board characteristics (Beasley and 
Petroni, 2001; Lin and Liu, 2009), and the audit committee (Abbott and Parker, 2000). With 
respect to ownership structure as a key corporate governance mechanism, the existing 
literature examines whether different ownership types are associated with auditor choice. 
Given the international prevalence of ownership concentration through family control, the 
relationship between family control and auditor choice is examined by El-Ghoul et al. (2007), 
Francis et al. (2009), Niskanen et al. (2010), and Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Steijvers (2011). 
As our sample firms includes family firms, we investigate the influence of this ownership 
structure on the auditor choice.  
   The remainder of this paper examines the determinants of auditor choice in Italian non-
listed firms, drawing upon the two approaches employed in the existing literature: the agency 
conflict approach and the organisational complexity approach.  
 
3.1.1. The agency conflict approach 
 
   In this section we analyze the key agency conflicts between non-listed firms and their 
stakeholders with reference to the existing literature. The foundation on which most family 
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firm studies are built is the agency conflict framework. The unique characteristics of family 
firms affect the nature and extent of agency problems. The effect of family ownership on 
earnings quality in listed firms is controversial and is explored through two conflicting 
agency problems: the type I agency problem, the classic owner-manager conflict, and the 
type II agency problem, the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
(Ali et al., 2007; An, 2015). If we consider the type I agency problem, family owners have a 
strong monitoring incentive to maintain their wealth as longer-term investors. The family can 
reduce agency problems between owners and managers by placing one of their members in 
the position of the manager (Anderson et al., 2003). For the type II agency problem, as 
family shareholdings increase, family managers become less constrained by disciplinary 
forces and are more entrenched, and thus higher family ownership can give rise to lower 
earnings quality which in turn requires only a lower quality auditor (An, 2015). In fact, Ali et 
al. (2007) find that, compared to listed non-family firms, listed family firms face less severe 
agency problems from the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency 
problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.  
   However, important differences exist between non-listed and listed firms in both corporate 
governance terms and the contracting incentives to provide high quality financial information 
through high quality audit. Thus, the empirical evidence for listed family firms does not 
necessarily extend to non-listed family firms (Beatty et al., 2002; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). We argue that the accounting quality of non-listed family firms is not only driven by 
the typical (Type I and II) agency problems documented in listed firms but also by the 
specific agency problems of non-listed firms relating to influential stakeholders. As the 
key/influential stakeholders of Italian non-listed (family or otherwise) firms are banks 
(Vinciguerra and Cipullo, 2009; La Rocca and Montalto, 2012), we argue that a different 
motivation for audit quality arises from the bank-firm relationship.  
 
Ownership variables 
 
a) Ownership concentration, foreign ownership and board independence 
   Evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and auditor choice is 
provided in the prior empirical literature, though it concerns mainly listed firms. Fan and 
Wong (2005) find that firms subject to greater agency problems associated with higher 
ownership concentration are more likely to hire Big N auditors, thereby supporting the view 
that the large audit firms can enhance the confidence of capital market investors. In 
companies with concentrated ownership, large shareholders can affect the firm’s 
management, especially when they become board members. Hu and Izumida (2008) argue 
that ownership concentration has an impact on corporate performance. Chen et al. (2007) 
argue that the audit service demanded by firms with controlling shareholders may be different 
from that demanded by firms without controlling shareholders, and find that audit quality 
deteriorates and is compromised when an auditor is engaged by a family-controlled business 
client. This negative association is also found by El-Ghoul et al. (2015), who study 13 
Western European countries, and by Copley and Douthett (2002), Francis et al. (2009), and 
Darmadi et al. (2012), who analyze the association between ownership concentration and the 
probability of hiring large audit firms in the US, France, and Indonesia. Lin and Liu (2009) 
show that Chinese firms with greater ownership concentration are less likely to hire Big N 
auditors. Further, Dong and Zhang (2008) find for listed Chinese firms that the propensity of 
external auditors to qualify is lower, the higher the concentration of shares or the lower 
proportion of public shares. Family ownership and governance are widespread, both among 
privately held companies, but also among publicly traded firms (Bukart et al., 2003; Morck 
and Yeung, 2004). The literature confirms that family firms are prevalent in Italy as a 
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corporate form (e.g. Cascino et al., 2010; La Rocca and Montalto, 2012). Ang et al. (2000) 
argue that agency conflicts necessitate the monitoring of management in non-listed firms as 
such firms are not always run by owner-managers. Consistent with the literature, and in 
particular with Ali et al. (2007), Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, (2011) and An (2015), 
we argue that non-listed firms with greater family ownership concentration have less 
incentive to engage a high quality auditor (an external auditor) because of the type II agency 
problem, that is, the conflict between majority and minority shareholders. In particular, 
Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen (2011) find that audit quality, in terms of selecting Big 
4 auditors, is demanded by non-listed firms for the purpose of addressing the loss of control 
of outside shareholders as a result of ownership dispersion. Moreover, Francis et al. (2009) 
investigate the demand for audit quality in a sample of French listed firms, and find that the 
demand for audit quality decreases with an increase in ownership concentration and inside 
family ownership. Niskanen et al. (2010) show similar results for Finnish non-listed family 
firms. Therefore, consistent with this literature, we investigate whether family ownership also 
influences auditor choice in non-listed firms. 
   In addition to ownership concentration, family control may also play an important role in 
either exacerbating or mitigating agency problems between the controlling family and other 
shareholders (Darmadi, 2012). As suggested by Steijvers et al. (2010), family-controlled 
firms are more vulnerable to agency problems. Firstly, since it has effective control of the 
firm and assigns its members to sit either on the board or management team, the controlling 
family may have greater opportunity for extracting private benefits and lower corporate 
transparency. Thus, family firms may be reluctant to impose external monitoring and are 
more likely to engage low-quality auditors to protect the family’s private interests (Niskanen, 
Karjalainen, and Steijvers, 2011). Secondly, and conversely, family firms are concerned 
somewhat more than other firms about their long-term survival and reputation, leading them 
to provide high-quality financial information to maintain investors’ confidence (Dey et al., 
2011). This may lead to the appointment of high-quality auditors. Finally, Darmadi, (2012) 
find that there is a strong positive association between ownership concentration and the 
demand for Big 4 auditors, contrasting the findings of many single-country studies which 
find a negative relationship. A positive relation may imply that when the proportion of shares 
held by the largest shareholder increases, firms are more aware of agency issues, thus leading 
them to engage higher-quality auditors in order to set in place an additional monitoring 
function; high-quality audits may then be used to mitigate the agency issues that arise 
between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. However, when the 
controlling shareholder is a family, the association between ownership concentration and the 
demand for high-quality auditors becomes negative, suggesting that family-controlled firms 
are significantly less likely to have their financial statements audited by Big 4 auditors. Thus 
family-controlled firms are less likely to experience information asymmetry problems as firm 
ownership and control are less separated, leading to a lower demand for high-quality auditors. 
La Rocca and Montalto (2012) argue that in Italy type II agency problems are relevant. 
Larger shareholders may use their position to extract private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders. In particular, if the largest shareholder is an individual or a 
family, as in Italy, then they have a significant incentive to expropriate (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). In our paper, we employ a dummy variable (OWN) which takes a value of 1 if at least 
50% of the voting rights or outstanding shares are held by a family, and takes the value of 0 
otherwise, consistent with the approach of Cascino et al. (2010), providing a more granular 
distinction between family-owned companies and firms with other major block holders (non-
family-run firms). The following hypothesis is thus proposed: 
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H1a. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor decreases as family ownership concentration increases.  
 
b) Foreign shareholders 
Karim et al. (2013), analysing the auditor choice of emerging market IPO firms, find that 
foreign shareholders tend to trade-off the increased monitoring costs of engaging a higher 
quality auditor with information asymmetry agency costs. Van Zijl and Karim (2010) find 
that the foreign shareholders of listed firms have more incentive to assign financial auditing 
to high quality auditors as they are concerned about financial statement information quality 
and wish to protect their investment. Thus, as we determined in the previous section there is 
evidence that listed firms prefer a high quality (external) auditor as the proportion of foreign 
ownership (FOWN) increases, though for non-listed firms there is a paucity of evidence. 
Consistent with the literature for listed firms, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1b. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor increases as the degree of foreign share ownership increases. 
 
c) Board independence 
The separation of ownership and control increases agency conflicts within the firm (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and thereby increases the need for management monitoring (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ang et al., 2000). The literature suggests that firms with more 
independent boards tend to commit less financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996) and 
generate lower discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000; Xie et al., 
2003; Jaggi et al., 2009) than firms with less independent boards. However, the empirical 
evidence is mixed.  
   Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen (2011) find that the probability of non-listed firms 
engaging a Big 4 auditor decreases as CEO ownership increases. Thus, firms with a weaker 
internal corporate governance mechanism (e.g. high ownership concentration) are inclined to 
choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain the gains to their opaqueness. 
Mengoli et al. (2009, p. 7) suggest that the dominant role of large shareholders, which 
extends even to the Board of Directors, leads to a system characterized by “weak managers, 
strong block holders and unprotected minority shareholders”. Family control has been 
identified as the harbinger of both benefits and costs (Favero et al., 2006). However, in the 
Italian context, characterized by concentrated family ownership, it is possible that directors 
classified as independent may not be independent in substance at all (Prencipe and Bar-
Yosef, 2011). In this context, it is difficult to predict the sign of association between board 
independence and auditor choice (e.g. Beasley and Petroni, 2001). In this study, we employ a 
dummy variable (BOARD) which takes a value of 1 if more than 50% of the voting rights 
belong to the managers, and the value of 0 otherwise. To address the uncertainty in this 
relation, we propose the following non-directional hypothesis: 
 
H1c. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor is associated with the degree of board independence.  
 
External characteristics and relations of the firm 
 
a) International activities 
Firms with a strong international presence are more likely to engage a high quality auditor as 
such auditors are better able to tackle the constraints presented by geographical dispersal and 
to capture the benefits from specialized correspondents in local legislatures who can make 
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on-site visits at relatively low cost (Piot, 2005). Chaney et al. (2004) find that firms making 
foreign sales require the services of auditors with international business expertise. In this 
paper we employ the proportion of sales made outside the country of origin (FSALES) as a 
proxy for the degree of internationalization, and we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor increases with the degree of internationalization. 
 
b) Leverage 
Seminal studies of leverage such as Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
find that the severity of the agency conflict increases with the proportion of debt in a firm’s 
capital structure. A firm requiring new financing will want to strengthen the credibility of its 
financial statements by engaging a high quality auditor. Higher quality auditing is required by 
the creditors for monitoring or by the shareholders to signal financial information credibility 
(Blackwell et al., 1998; Bharat et al., 2006; Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Knechel et al., 2008). 
Knechel et al. (2008) find that auditor choice in Finnish firms is driven by firm financing 
requirements. Management has an incentive or even compulsion to signal financial statement 
credibility to creditors by engaging a highly qualified auditor (e.g. Carey et al., 2000). 
Existing studies find that the availability of new financing depends on the riskiness of the 
firm (Knechel et al., 2008), and that improved disclosure reduces investor risk (Botosan, 
1997). However, Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen (2011) find evidence for Finnish non-
listed firms that shareholder-manager agency conflicts reduce the demand for audit quality as 
leverage increases, as leverage aligns manager-shareholder incentives and reduces the need 
for monitoring. Further, Fortin and Pittman (2007) observe that auditor choice affects neither 
the yield spread nor the credit rating of US non-listed firms, while Broye and Weill (2008) 
find that the impact of leverage on auditor quality varies across countries. According to 
Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, (2011), the existing literature suggests that the equity 
ownership structure of a firm affects the manager-shareholder conflict, and therefore the 
agency costs related to this information asymmetry. When managers’ stockholdings increase, 
management becomes more likely to make decisions consistent with the best interests of 
other stockholders, and at the expense of bondholders or other uninformed stakeholders. This 
suggests that as managerial share ownership increases, shareholder-manager agency costs 
initially decrease and shareholder-creditor agency costs increase. In other words, agency 
conflicts related to the shareholder-creditor agency relationship imply that an increase in 
financial leverage should increase the demand for audit quality. Higher quality auditors could 
be engaged by the owners to signal the credibility of the firm’s financial information, or by 
creditors for the purposes of monitoring the firm. To mitigate agency problems, controlling 
owners may employ different monitoring and bonding mechanisms to assure minority 
shareholders that their interests are protected (Fan and Wong, 2005). According to Niskanen, 
Karjalainen, and Niskanen (2011), the same idea can be extended to other stakeholders such 
as creditors (e.g. lenders), and thus monitoring and bonding mechanisms are also important 
for smaller, non-listed firms. Therefore, it may be argued that such firms have an incentive to 
engage a more credible, high quality auditor when managerial ownership (that is family 
ownership) decreases. Thus, it is argued in our study that in non-listed firms with family 
control, high quality auditors present more value to shareholders than to creditors. 
   We measure leverage (LEV) as the ratio of total financial debt (the sum of debt to banks, 
other capital providers, and bondholders) to total assets. Importantly, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) find that non-listed firms tend also to rely heavily on financing through trade credit 
which constitutes a form of ‘free’ financing. We thus construct a measure for the growth in 
trade accounts payable (APGROW) to proxy for a reduction in the need for new external 
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finance: as accounts (trade) payables increase, free financing increases, and the requirement 
for new financing should be reduced. Effectively, accounts payables substitute for leverage. 
APGROW is defined as the relative change in accounts payable for the year. Consistent with 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which posits that agency costs increase with the 
proportion of outside financing of the firm, we expect auditor choice to be positively related 
to both LEV and APGROW and we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H3. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor increases as leverage and the accounts (trade) payable growth rate increase.  
 
3.1.2. Organisational complexity and the audit risk approach 
 
Firm internal characteristics and relations 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 59) hypothesize that agency costs increase with firm size 
“because it is likely that the monitoring function is inherently more difficult and expensive in 
a larger organization”. Further, it is argued that there is more wealth at risk in larger firms, 
which also increases agency costs (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). Simunic and Stein (1987) and 
Abbott and Parker (2000) hypothesize a positive relationship between client firm size and the 
quality of audit firms chosen, arguing that client size is a critical indicator of the extent of 
client agency costs. Similarly, larger clients may have become accustomed to superior 
services from a myriad of professional advisors, and thus they may be less satisfied with the 
services of small audit firms. Furthermore, bigger clients may require the additional 
professional services, such as consultancy, tax and legal services, which are more likely to be 
supplied by (external) larger audit firms (Aksu et al., 2007). Larger firms are therefore 
predicted to be more likely to engage a high quality auditor (that is, an external auditor). Firm 
size is therefore considered a proxy for increased agency costs and a greater need for 
monitoring (Broye and Weill, 2008). In our study, we measure firm size (SIZE) as the 
logarithm of total assets. Consistent with the existing literature, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4a. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor increases as firm size increases. 
 
   A high quality auditor may help managers to improve firm efficiency and effectiveness, 
especially as the firm grows. However, as a firm grows it becomes more complex and 
difficult to control (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). Firms with greater asset, operational, 
financial, and transactional complexity will benefit in particular from a high quality auditor 
(Newton and Ashton, 1989; Knechel et al., 2008). Abdel-Khalik (1993) finds evidence of 
increased oversight difficultly for the owners of growing non-listed firms. Thus, more 
complex firms have a greater incentive to choose a high quality auditor (Simunic and Stein, 
1987; Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Hay and Davis, 2004; Knechel et al., 2008). As discussed in 
section 2, the role of the BSA as administrative auditor in the traditional corporate 
governance model of Italian firms is to respect both laws and corporate by-laws, to attend to 
the principles of correct management, to verify the appropriateness of administrative, 
organizational and accounting patterns, and also to pay attention to the procedures adopted by 
management in pursuing the objectives of the firm. As a consequence the administrative 
auditor ensures the continuous and simultaneous supervision of management in the capacity 
of an independent body which is both highly qualified and furnished with significant powers 
of intervention. This structural characteristic is markedly different from that adopted in other 
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countries where there is no such clear role and responsibility distinction between the officers 
that administrate and those that perform control functions. Thus, understanding the strong 
control of the administrative auditor (BSA), and in contrast to the existing literature, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4b. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor decreases as firm complexity increases. 
 
   We use two measures to gauge the complexity of the firm. Firstly, as we are unable to 
measure the length of the chain of control directly due to data constraints, we instead employ 
the ratio of total annual salaries paid to total operating expenses (SALARY), consistent with 
Knechel et al. (2008). Secondly, following Knechel et al., we gauge complexity (COMPLEX) 
as the sum of property, plant and equipment, inventory and receivables, scaled by total assets. 
This second measure reflects the asset and transactional complexity of the firm, consistent 
with Stice (1991) and Hay et al. (2006).  
   Ge and McVay (2005) argue that many disclosed material control weaknesses are due to 
problems in subsidiaries. Knechel et al. argue that firms are more likely to be audited by an 
external auditor when they are themselves subsidiaries of larger entities, as a parent will 
extend its financial auditing system to all of its subsidiaries to ensure effective monitoring. In 
our study, we employ a dummy variable (GROUP) to reflect the subsidiary status of the firm 
which equals 1 if the firm belongs to a group, and 0 otherwise. We propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4c. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor increases where it is the subsidiary of a larger parent company. 
 
   We examine the association between measures of firm risk (and thus auditing complexity) 
and the demand for external, high quality audit. Poorly performing firms have an incentive to 
manipulate performance (Rogers and Stocken, 2005), and may therefore wish to signal that 
they have not resorted to earnings management by engaging a high quality auditor. Non-
listed firms with higher proportions of receivables and inventories may seek to obtain 
validation of these balances for the benefit of stakeholders such as suppliers (Dedman et al., 
2014). Simunic (1980) notes that such assets are difficult to audit, requiring observation and 
confirmation, thereby increasing auditor liability exposure. Similarly, creditors will take 
comfort when observing higher levels of balance sheet cash. However, non-listed, cash-based 
businesses present problems of verifiability (Godwin and Freedman, 1993). Thus, higher 
levels of inventory, receivables, and cash can lead to increased audit cost and riskiness, 
though greater value to the firm through independent (external) auditor verification. Finally, 
consistent with Knechel et al. (2008), we focus on the percentage growth in firm sales 
(SALEGROW) on the basis that rapid growth can lead to stressed or broken internal processes 
and increase firm complexity and riskiness (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). However, given 
the strong control of the administrative auditor (a BSA), highlighted above in hypothesis 
H4b, and in contrast with the existing literature, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H4d. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor decreases as sales growth and the balances of receivables, inventories, cash and cash 
equivalents increases. 
 
   Consistent with Dedman et al. (2014), we measure the riskiness of a firm’s audit by means 
of three measures: inventories (INV), receivables (REC), and cash and cash equivalents 
14 
 
(CASH), all scaled by total assets. Further, SALEGROW is measured as the relative change in 
sales. 
   Finally, we argue that younger firms may present greater audit risk due to increased 
information asymmetry (Diamond, 1989; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), thereby increasing their 
demand for an external independent auditor. Further, Pittman and Fortin (2004) find that the 
value of audit assurance to newly public companies is higher in terms of borrowing costs than 
for older firms which have a long history. Thus, as firms build a credit reputation through 
time, the monitoring value of the audit is reduced. We therefore expect to observe a negative 
relationship between age in non-listed firms and the likelihood of engaging an external 
auditor. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4e. The probability that an Italian non-listed firm assigns financial auditing to an external 
auditor decreases as firm age increases.  
 
   Consistent with Dedman et al. (2014), we gauge firm reputation as the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s length of establishment in years (AGE). 
 
Control variables 
 
   We include a number of control variables. We argue above that a firm may have an 
incentive to engage a low quality auditor (a BSA) to potentially disguise its true profitability. 
Dedman and Lennox (2007) point out that more profitable firms have an incentive to conceal 
proprietary information, suggesting that they may also wish to engage low quality auditors. 
We measure profitability in terms of the return on assets (ROA) and expect a negative 
relationship. When analyzing the demand for audit quality in terms of the choice of a BSA or 
an external auditor, we also control for firm legal form (LEGFORM) whereby the firm is 
invited by the Italian civil code to use the BSA as a priority (for an Llc) or an external auditor 
(for a PC). Consistent with Broye and Weill (2008) and Niskanen, Karjalainen, and 
Niskanen, (2011) we expect a positive relationship. This variable takes the value 1 if the firm 
is incorporated as a stock company, and the value zero if incorporated as a limited liability 
firm. We include an industry classification dummy (IND) to assess if industry type has an 
impact on auditor choice, with the dummy taking the value of 1 for manufacturing firms, and 
zero otherwise. 
   To capture differences in parent company nationality, we include the variable NAT to take 
the value 1 where the parent is non-Italian, and zero otherwise. Here, we argue that a 
subsidiary is more likely to engage an external audit firm where the parent is non-Italian as: 
(i) non-Italian firms may only choose between a Big 4 or non-Big 4 external auditor; and (ii) 
a foreign parent company is less familiar with (subsidiary) Italian national accounting 
regulation. Finally, we account for the voluntary adoption of IFRS (IFRS) which may result 
from engaging a Big 4 audit firm. Such firms offer an international network of IFRS 
specialists and a track record in supporting IFRS transition (Hail et al. 2010). Thus we expect 
that firms complying voluntarily with IFRS in the preparation of their financial statements are 
more likely to choose a Big 4 (external) auditor because of the international auditing 
expertise of the latter. Thus, in this case the engagement of a high quality auditor is a 
consequence of IFRS adoption. The control variable IFRS takes the value 1 if the firm 
voluntarily adopted IFRS, and zero otherwise. 
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4. Research Methodology and Sample Selection  
 
   Our accounting, financial market and corporate governance data are collected from the 
Bureau van Dijk AIDA Database in 2011, at which time the year 2009 is the latest available. 
The data population is composed of Italian non-listed firms which are ‘firms that do not have 
public accountability’, are not obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements, and 
which have equity capital exceeding €120,000. We exclude financial industry firms due to 
their non-standard financial statements and regulatory status, consistent with existing studies. 
In total, 52,418 firms meet our sample selection criteria, that is, firms faced with the choice 
of assigning their financial auditing either to a BSA or an external auditor. From this body of 
firms we extract a random sample of 384 firms, consistent with the approaches of Kreicie and 
Morgan (1970), as many of the data items must be collected by hand. 
   Table 2 shows the distribution of firms by auditor type. 74% (284) of sample firms assign 
their financial auditing to a BSA, while only 26% (100) sample firms choose an external 
auditor. 108  firms (28%) are non-listed stock companies, and of these 62 firms (57%) assign 
their financial auditing to a BSA, with the remaining 46 firms (43%) audited by an external 
auditor. However, 276 (72%) firms in our sample are limited liability firms, and of these 222 
firms (80%) are audited by a BSA, while 54 (20%) assign their financial auditing to an 
external auditor. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
   We estimate a logistic regression model, as given in Equation 1, with the dependent 
variable AUDIT defined as a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the firm is audited by an 
external auditor, and 0 where firm auditing is undertaken by the BSA. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 = 1) =
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 +
 𝛽11𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽16𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑖 +
𝛽17𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽18𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽19𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽20𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
(1) 
Where: 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 = auditor choice dichotomous variable; 𝑂𝑊𝑁 = family ownership 
concentration dummy; 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁 = degree of foreign ownership dummy; 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 = directors’ 
independence dummy; 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 = degree of foreign sales; 𝐿𝐸𝑉 = leverage ratio; 𝐴𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 
account payables growth rate; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 = sales growth rate; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 = salaries to total 
expenses; 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑋 = firm organizational complexity variable; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = natural logarithm of 
total assets; 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 = subsidiary status dummy; 𝐼𝑁𝑉 = inventories to total assets; 𝑅𝐸𝐶 = 
receivables to total assets; 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 = cash and cash equivalents to total assets; 𝐴𝐺𝐸 = natural 
logarithm of firm age; 𝑁𝐴𝑇 = parent company nationality dummy; 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 = voluntary 
adoption of IFRS dummy; 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = return on assets ratio; 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 = legal form dummy; 
𝐼𝑁𝐷 = industry type dummy; and 𝜀 = model error term. 
 
   Table 3 provides detailed definitions of the independent variables, along with a summary of 
expected coefficient signs and associated hypotheses. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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5. Results 
 
Table 4 reports statistics for model dummy variables for firms audited by the BSA in Panel A 
and firms audited by an external auditor in Panel B. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of 
the continuous study variables by auditor type.  
 
 [Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
   We commence our analysis by examining the factors related to agency conflicts first and 
then considering the factors which proxy for the size and the organizational complexity of the 
firm. 64% of the firms audited by a BSA have close (family) ownership (OWN), a pattern 
which contrasts with firms audited by an external auditor, 82% of which have dispersed 
ownership. Thus, an increase in ownership dispersion increases the probability of assigning 
financial auditing to an external auditor to counter reduced shareholder control over 
management. Only 10% of firms which engage a BSA have foreign shareholders (FOWN), 
whereas a much higher 45% of firms engaging an external auditor have foreign shareholders. 
66% of firms audited by a BSA are characterised by low board independence (BOARD), 
while 82% of firms audited by an external auditor have largely independent boards. Thus, on 
a prima facie basis, greater board independence tends to increased firm demand for external 
auditors. Neither BSA audited nor externally audited firms appear to be international in 
focus, with international sales to total sales (FSALES) of around only 10% in each case. 
Moreover, firms audited by an external auditor are somewhat more leveraged (LEV) than 
firms audited by a BSA, with leverage ratios of around 18% and 14%, respectively. The 
accounts payable growth ratio (APGROW) of 7% for BSA audited firms is higher than the 
1% contraction for those firms audited by an external auditor. Thus we may infer that BSA 
audited firms appear to have a significant need for new finance on the basis of these proxies 
(LEV and APGROW). Externally audited firms appear to have a significant need for new 
finance on the basis of the leverage alone.  
   In terms of proxies for firm organizational complexity, we observe that annual salaries to 
total operating expenses (SALARY) is broadly invariant across the auditor types, with  a ratio 
of 17% for firms audited by a BSA and 18% for firms audited by an external auditor. When 
organizational complexity is proxied by asset intensity (COMPLEX), we find it to be 
markedly higher in firms audited by a BSA (50%) than in firms audited by an external 
auditor (41%). Finally, when organizational complexity is proxied by revenue growth 
(SALEGROW), we find that it is markedly higher in firms audited by a BSA (4.4%) than in 
firms audited by an external auditor (2.3%). BSA audited firms thus grow more rapidly than 
externally audited firms, which may lead to internal process stress, increasing firm 
complexity and risk. Firms audited by a BSA tend to be smaller (SIZE) than their externally 
audited counterparts, with a natural logarithm of total assets of 9.7 compared to 10.5, 
respectively. In sum, organizational complexity is not clearly linked to auditor choice in 
terms of labor measures, though more complex firms in terms of asset intensity and rapid 
growth prefer a BSA to an external auditor, a result consistent with our expectations.  
   Subsidiary status (GROUP) appears to influence auditor choice as 78% of externally 
audited firms belong to a wider economic group compared to only 32% of BSA audited 
firms. With regard to parent company nationality (NAT) we find that 90% of firm parent 
companies audited by a BSA are Italian, compared to only 42% for firms audited by an 
external auditor. Thus, sample firm parent companies are predominantly Italian and hence are 
more likely to be audited by the statutory committee.  
   In terms of voluntary IFRS adoption (IFRS), only a single firm (<1%) audited by a BSA 
prepares its statements according to IFRS, while five firms (5%) audited by an external 
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auditor do so. With regard to industry type (IND), we observe that the majority of BSA 
audited (65%) and externally audited (66%) firms are manufacturers. There are significant 
differences in firm profitability (ROA) across auditor types, with firms audited by a BSA 
exhibiting an ROA of 2.97% while firms audited by an external auditor enjoy a higher return 
of 3.81%. The legal form (LEGFORM) variable reveals that a much higher proportion (46%) 
of firms audited by an external auditor are incorporated as a stock company than firms 
audited by a BSA (22%). 
   Table 6 presents the correlation matrix for our model variables. A positive (negative) 
correlation here implies that an increase (decrease) in a given variable leads to firms choosing 
an external auditor (BSA). A Spearman (Pearson) correlation was computed to assess the 
association between the dependent and independent variables, with Spearman (Pearson) 
correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal line. The Spearman correlation is a 
nonparametric test which measures the strength and direction of association between two 
variables that are measured on an ordinal or continuous scale and its associated correlation 
coefficients are denoted below by the symbol rs. It is a useful test for cases when a Pearson 
correlation cannot be computed due, for example, to discrete variables being used. The 
Spearman correlation shows that there is a weak positive correlation between auditor choice 
(AUDIT) and FOWN (rs=0.387, p=0.000), SIZE (rs=0.260, p=0.000), NAT (rs=0.359, 
p=0.000) and LEGFORM (rs=0.236, p=0.000). We find that there is a moderate positive 
correlation between AUDIT and BOARD (rs=0.421, p=0.000) and GROUP (rs=-0.406, 
p=0.000), a moderate negative correlation between AUDIT and OWN (rs=-0.402, p=0.000) 
and a very weak negative correlation with COMPLEX (rs=-0.147, p=0.004). The Pearson 
correlation matrix shows a moderately significant positive correlation between auditor choice 
(AUDIT) and the variables FOWN (r=0.387, p=0.000), BOARD (r=0.421, p=0.000), SIZE 
(r=0.309, p=0.000), GROUP (r=0.406, p=0.000), NAT (r=0.359, p=0.000) and LEGFORM 
(r=0.236, p=0.000). We also find a small positive correlation between AUDIT and IFRS 
(r=0.164, p=0.001) which may be explained by the very small number of non-listed firms 
that adopted voluntarily to comply with IFRS. Finally, we find a moderate negative 
correlation between AUDIT and the variable OWN (r=-0.402, p=0.000) and a moderate 
negative correlation with the variable COMPLEX (r=-0.154, p=0.003). To test for potential 
multicollinearity problems we compute though do not report variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
but find that the statistics are substantially below the threshold of 10 for all variables.  
 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
 
   Table 7 presents the results of our model of auditor choice in Italian non-listed firms. The 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 where a firm chooses an external auditor and 0 when it 
chooses a BSA. The independent variables are grouped by type to highlight the impact of: (i) 
agency factors; (ii) organizational complexity factors; and (iii) control variables. 
  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
   We commence our discussion here with the agency factors. Family ownership 
concentration (OWN) evidences a negative relation as expected, though is insignificant. This 
finding may be explained by the prevailing type II Agency Problem (Ali et al., 2007). Thus, 
as family shareholdings increase, family managers become less constrained by disciplinary 
forces and more entrenched, and higher family ownership can give rise to lower earnings 
quality (An, 2015), thereby leading to a reduced requirement for high financial auditor 
quality (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelem, 2008). Thus, hypothesis H1a is not supported as 
family ownership concentration does not drive auditor choice, consistent with Niskanen, 
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Karjalainen, and Niskanen, (2011). The foreign ownership (FOWN) dummy has a positive 
coefficient, as expected, though is insignificant, perhaps as only 19% of sample firms have at 
least one foreign owner. Consistent with Karim et al. (2013), foreign shareholders tend to 
trade-off the increased monitoring costs of engaging a higher quality auditor with information 
asymmetry agency costs. Thus, hypothesis H1b is not supported as foreign ownership does 
not drive auditor choice, a result which is inconsistent with Van Zijl and Karim (2010). Board 
independence (BOARD) is significantly positively related to auditor choice at the 5% level, 
and thus increasing board independence leads to a greater likelihood of engaging an external 
auditor. This finding suggests that greater board independence mitigates family influence in 
firms with concentrated family ownership, and so engage a high quality auditor in order to 
signal the quality of earnings. Thus, hypothesis H1c is supported and we are able to confirm 
the otherwise uncertain coefficient sign as positive in the Italian context.  
   The coefficient for the foreign revenues variable (FSALES) is negative, though  
insignificant, a finding inconsistent with the existing literature, and thus hypothesis H2 is not 
supported. This finding is inconsistent with Piot (2005) and Chaney et al. (2004), where both 
studies find evidence that internationalization tends to lead to the choice of a high quality 
auditor. The coefficient of the leverage ratio variable (LEV) is positive though insignificant. 
Thus, there is no clear evidence that firms requiring new financing want to signal their 
credibility through engaging an external auditor, and our results do not support the work of 
Carey et al. (2000). The accounts payable growth variable (APGROW) has an insignificant 
negative coefficient which is inconsistent with expectations. Overall, there is no evidence of a 
relationship between auditor choice and the degree of financial distress risk, with firms 
instead relying on a close relationship with banks and creditors (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
We thus find no support for hypothesis H3. Importantly, excepting board independence, 
agency factors are not strong drivers of auditor choice. We suggest that the administrative 
auditing role of a BSA both mitigates type I and type II agency problems, and the conflict 
between the firms and the influential stakeholder.  
   With regard to the organizational complexity and risk factors, the size (SIZE) coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with expectations and with Knechel et al. 
(2008) and Aksu et al. (2007). This finding may be explained by the argument that agency 
costs increase with company size as the monitoring function is “inherently more difficult and 
expensive in a larger organization” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 59). Further, it is argued 
that there is more wealth at risk in larger companies, which increases agency costs (Abdel-
Khalik, 1993). Thus larger firms are more likely to appoint an external auditor, and 
hypothesis H4a is supported. The coefficient for salaries to expenses (SALARY) is positive, 
which is inconsistent with expectations, though is insignificant. It is possible that it is too 
indirect a proxy for organizational complexity in Italian firms, particularly as salary expense 
ratios are similar across auditor choice firm types. However, we find that the second 
organizational complexity variable (COMPLEX) related to asset intensity is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, as expected, and thus increased ‘asset complexity’ leads to firms 
engaging a BSA rather than an external auditor. Our finding here may be explained in 
relation to the administrative role of a BSA whereby it monitors the firm’s operations on a 
day-by-day basis, in turn taking the place of an external auditor in the control of firm 
complexity. Hypothesis H4b is thus supported, though only for ‘asset complexity’ 
(COMPLEX) as increased firm complexity here reduces rather than increases the need for an 
external auditor. The coefficient of the subsidiary status variable (GROUP) is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, and thus subsidiaries are more likely to assign their auditing to an 
external auditor, consistent with their parent, and in line with studies such as Knechel et al. 
(2008). Thus, hypothesis H4c is supported.  
   With regard to ‘risky’ balance sheet components, the coefficient for inventory (INV) is 
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positive and significant at the 5% level, which is inconsistent with our expectations, but 
consistent with the existing literature (Dedman et al., 2014; Simunic, 1980). This finding may 
be explained by non-listed firms with higher proportions of inventories wishing to obtain 
‘external’ validation of these balances to stakeholders such as suppliers. However, the 
coefficient for receivables (REC) is negative and significant at the 10% level, as expected, 
contrasting with the results of Dedman et al. Thus, in contrast to inventories, this finding may 
be explained by the financial auditing role of the BSA as it remains a trusted professional and 
independent body with a financial auditing role, even where it constrains earnings 
management practices less than an external auditor. The coefficient for cash and cash 
equivalents (CASH) is positive, consistent with Dedman et al. and inconsistent with our 
expectations, though is insignificant. The coefficient for revenue growth (SALEGROW) is 
negative and insignificant, which is consistent with expectations, and inconsistent with 
Knechel et al. (2008) who find it to have a positive impact. Thus, perusal of our results across 
these four risky balance sheet components reveals that hypothesis H4d is in general not 
supported, except in the case of receivables. Our findings here also provide evidence to 
support the role of a BSA within the corporate governance function of non-listed firms 
whereby it monitors firm complexity and risk. It may be that the administrative audit role of 
the BSA combined with the financial audit role, whereby it both monitors firm operations and 
monitors the preparation of its financial statements, validates these balances adequately, 
removing the need for an external auditor. The coefficient for firm age (AGE) is negative as 
expected, consistent with Dedman et al., though is insignificant, and thus hypothesis H4e is 
not supported. Thus, the length of establishment does not impact on auditor choice in our 
study. 
   In terms of the control variables, there is little evidence of profitability (ROA) driving 
auditor choice, a result which is inconsistent with Dedman and Lennox (2007). The 
coefficient for legal form (LEGFORM) is positive, as expected, and significant at the 10% 
level, and thus there is weak evidence that firms incorporated as stock companies are more 
likely to engage an external auditor, consistent with the Italian Civil Code. The coefficient for 
IFRS is positive and significant at the 5% level, and thus as expected, external auditors are 
more likely to be engaged when a firm requires greater financial reporting expertise to deal 
with IFRS. The remaining control variables are insignificant and thus parent company 
nationality (NAT) and industry type (IND) have no measurable impact on auditor choice.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This study examines the determinants of the choice between an external, high quality auditor 
and a BSA in Italian non-listed firms. As 52% of our sample firms are characterised by 
family ownership, we also investigate whether family ownership influences auditor choice in 
such firms. The existing literature argues that auditor choice may be driven by agency 
problems and/or the need for organizational effectiveness and efficiency, and is thus 
determined by organizational complexity and risk (Knechel et al., 2008; Dedman et al., 
2014). In this paper, we argue that engaging a BSA as financial auditor potentially deals with 
organizational complexity in Italian non-listed firms as firms communicate privately with 
their stakeholders rather than having to engage highly qualified and expensive external 
auditors. We model auditor choice in relation to variables proxying for agency issues, 
organizational complexity, and firm risk factors.  
   In Italy, non-listed firms may assign financial auditing either to statutory auditors or to an 
external auditor. Independent statutory auditors (BSA) work within such firms on an 
operational basis and also conduct an administrative auditing function. Mariani et al. (2010) 
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and Cameran and Prencipe (2011) argue that a BSA provides lower audit quality than an 
external auditor, while Bisogno (2012) finds no such evidence. 
   Our analysis shows that of the agency factors, only board independence, consistent with 
Beasley and Petroni (2001), drives auditor choice, with greater manager independence 
leading to the choice of an external auditor. According to Niskanen, Karjalainen, and 
Niskanen (2011), the demand for audit quality increases as managerial ownership decreases. 
However, consistent with both Niskanen et al., and with Darmadi (2012), we find no 
evidence of an impact of family ownership concentration on auditor choice, perhaps 
explained by the fact that 52% of the firms in our sample have high family ownership 
concentration. There is no evidence of an impact on auditor choice of the degree of 
internationalization, both in terms of foreign ownership and foreign sales. There is also no 
evidence of leverage or accounts payable growth impacting upon auditor choice. One 
interpretation here is that non-listed firms are more likely to communicate privately with 
shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders than is the 
case for listed firms, thereby reducing the demand for high quality external auditors. Thus, 
our findings concerning leverage contrast with the findings of Carey et al. (2000), but are 
consistent with those of Fortin and Pittman (2007).  
   We also analyze the effect of organizational complexity proxies and audit risk on auditor 
choice. Our general hypothesis here is that increased audit complexity and risk issues are 
addressed in Italian non-listed firms by the BSA undertaking administrative auditing. This 
administrative function involves both the monitoring of the management and the firm’s 
operations, thereby reducing the risk of firm failure or stakeholder fraud. As a result of the 
involvement of the BSA, it is argued that, in general, Italian firms have a reduced need for a 
high quality, external auditor to monitor firm organizational complexity and audit risk. One 
organizational complexity proxy is salary burden, though we find in our study that it has an 
insignificant impact. However, in our study we find that an increase in complexity in terms of 
asset intensity reduces the likelihood of choosing an external auditor, a finding inconsistent 
with Knechel et al. (2008). Our findings thus suggest that Italian non-listed firms tend to rely 
on the administrative auditing skills of a BSA i.e. the presence of a BSA mitigates both 
agency problems of non-listed firms and deals with organizational complexity and risk. It 
appears that non-listed firms need strong corporate governance monitoring by an independent 
and professional body such as a BSA more than they need financial auditing. Our findings 
provide some support for the EU Green paper on corporate governance and the OECD (2015) 
proposal which both aim to improve the corporate governance of European non-listed firms. 
However, we find that larger firms, and incorporated firms which are subsidiaries of larger 
entities, are more likely to choose an external auditor due to the expertise and independence 
which characterizes such auditors (Piot, 2005; Niskanen, Karjalainen, and Niskanen, 2011). 
We argue that larger firms are interested in signaling high quality accounting information, 
while incorporated firms are driven by a parent company in their choice of auditor. For larger 
incorporated firms, then, the engagement of an external auditor is not driven by operational 
control issues. Further, we find that firms with higher investment in inventories favor the 
choice of an external auditor, firms with higher receivables favor the choice of a BSA, while 
firm sales growth and length of establishment exert no discernable impact.  
   Finally, with regard to the control variables, we find that firms incorporated as stock 
companies and firms voluntarily adopting IFRS tend to choose an external auditor, though 
the effect is only weak in the case of the latter (as in Italy only about 1% of non-listed firms 
adopt IFRS voluntarily). We infer that engagement of an external auditor is a consequence of 
the adoption of IFRS. Firm profitability, industry membership and parent company 
nationality have no discernable impact on auditor choice. 
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   We argue that while Italian law mandates all non-listed stock companies and limited 
liability firms with equity over €120,000 to be audited, it is unlikely that such firms will in 
general feel compelled to appoint a high quality (external) auditor. Our findings suggest that 
such firms, which are typically small or medium-sized, are more likely to assign their 
financial auditing to a BSA, particularly when they are characterised by complexity. As firms 
engaging external auditors tend to pay far higher auditing fees as a result, this also tends to 
militate against non-listed companies selecting such an auditor (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Choi et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008). Ultimately, then, auditor choice becomes a 
tradeoff between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of appointing a more costly yet 
higher quality external auditor. 
   Our findings have three key implications for research and practice. The first implication is 
that non-listed firms do not necessarily enjoy all of the benefits discussed in the existing 
literature for listed companies when engaging a high quality external auditor. Indeed there 
may be a net ‘economic’ cost of so doing given the significant fees charged by external 
auditors, thereby working in the favour of the BSA in a competitive audit market. The second 
implication of our study is that non-listed firms derive more benefit from internal 
independent and professional control rather than they do from financial auditing as they 
attempt to mitigate agency conflicts. Our results suggest that the regulator might consider the 
introduction of a mandatory financial auditing threshold for smaller non-listed firms in 
recognition of this. Finally, European countries that are considering the introduction of the 
IPSB for the corporate governance of European SMEs might examine the benefits conferred 
by an independent, professional and internal administrative auditing body such as the BSA to 
help firms to manage both internal and external agency problems. 
   There are two limitations of our current study: (i) we selected the year 2009 alone as this 
was the most recent year available unaffected by auditing system and business law reform; 
and (ii) our sample data was necessarily constrained in size by the requirement for hand 
collected data, particularly that related to corporate governance factors. 
 
References 
 
Abbott, L.J. and Parker, S. (2000), “Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics”, 
Auditing : A Journal of Practice and Theory (Fall), pp. 47-67. 
Abdel-Khalik, A. (1993), “Why do private companies demand auditing? A case for 
organizational loss of control”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 8 
No. 1, pp. 31-52. 
Aksu, M., Onder, T., and Saatcioglu, K. (2007), “Auditor selection, client firm 
characteristics, and corporate governance: evidence from an emerging markets”, 
Working paper, Sabanci University, Istanbul, May. Available on the internet at 
http://www.academia.edu/1774882/Ownership_Concentration_Family_Control_and_
Auditor_Choice_Evidence_from_an_Emerging_Market (Accessed 24 October 2015). 
AIDAF, Associazione Italiana Delle Aziende Familiari [Italian Association of Family 
Business – Family Business Network] (2015), “Le imprese familiari in Italia” [The 
Family Firms in Italy]. Available on the internet at http://www.aidaf.it/aidaf/le-
aziende-familiari-in-italia/ (Accessed 24 October 2015). 
Ali, A., Chen, T.Y., and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007), “Corporate disclosures by family firms”, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44 No. 1-2, pp. 238-286. 
An, Y. , (2015), “The Impact of Family Ownership on Firm Value and Earnings Quality: 
Evidence from Korea”, International Business Management, Vol. 9, pp. 625-636. 
Anderson, R.C., and Reeb, D.M. (2003), “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 No. 3, pp. 1301-1328. 
22 
 
Ang, J., Cole, R. and Lin, J. (2000), “Agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 55 No. 1 pp. 81-106. 
Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L. (2005), “Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss 
recognition timeliness”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 83−128. 
Beasley, M. (1996), “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, pp. 443-
465. 
Beasley, M.S. and Petroni, K.R. (2001), “Board Independence and Audit Firm Type”, 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 96-114. 
Beatty, A.L., Ke, B., and Petroni, K.R. (2002), “Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings 
Declines across Publicly and Privately Held Banks”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77 
No. 3, pp. 547-570.  
Becker, C.L., DeFond, M.L., Jiambalvo, J., and Subramanyam, K.R. (1998), “The effect of 
audit quality on earnings management‖, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 15 
No. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Bharat, S.T., Sunder J. and Sunder, S.V. (2006), “Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting”, 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 83, pp. 1–28. 
Bisogno, M. (2012), “Audit quality of Italian industrial non-listed firms: an empirical 
analysis”, International Journal of Business Research and Development, Vol. 1 No. 1, 
pp. 32−47. 
Blackwell, D. W., Noland, T.R.and Winters, D.B. (1998), “The value of auditor assurance: 
Evidence from loan pricing”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 36 No. 1, pp. 57-
70. 
Botosan, C. (1997), “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital”, Accounting Review, 
Vol. 72 No. 3, pp. 323-349. 
Broye G. and Weill, L. (2008), “Does leverage influence auditor choice? A cross-country 
analysis”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 715-731. 
Bukart, M., Panunzi, F., Shleifer, A, (2003), “Family firms”, The Journal of Finance, 53, pp. 
2167–2199. 
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., and Smith, A. (2004), “Financial accounting information, 
organizational complexity and corpo-rate governance systems”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 167–201. 
Cameran, M. and Prencipe, A. (2011), “Qualità della revisione contabile e tipo di revisore. Il 
caso delle società italiane con quotate” [Audit quality and type of Auditor: An 
analysis on Italian non-listed companies], Economia & Management, Vol. 1, pp. 99-
115. 
Carey, P., Simnett, R. and Tanewski, G. (2000), “Voluntary Demand for Internal and 
External Auditing by Family Businesses”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory, Vol. 19 (Supplement), pp. 37-51. 
Cascino, S., Pugliese, A., Mussolino, D. and Sansone, C. (2010), “The influence of family 
ownership on the quality of accounting information”, Family Business Review, Vol. 
23 No. 3, pp. 246-265. 
Chaney, P., Jeter, D. and Shivakumar, L. (2004), “Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing 
in private firms”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 79 No. 1, pp. 51−72. 
Chen, C., Yen, G., Fu, C. and Chang, F. (2007), “Family Control, Auditor Independence, and 
Audit Quality: Empirical Evidence from the TSE-Listed Firms (1999-2002)”, 
Corporate Ownership and Control, Volume 4 Issue 3, pp.96-110. 
Choi, J., Kim, J., Liu, X. and Simunic, D. (2008), “Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, 
and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence”, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 55−99. 
23 
 
Copley, P.A. and Douthett, E.B. (2002), “The association between auditor choice, ownership 
retained, and earnings disclosure by firms making initial public offerings”, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 49-75. 
Darmadi, S. (2012), “Ownership Concentration, Family Control, and Auditor Choice: 
Evidence from an Emerging Market”. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1999809. 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., and Schrand, C. (2010), “Understanding earnings quality: A review of 
the proxies, their determinants and their consequences”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 344–-401. 
Dechow, P., Sloan, R. and Sweeney, A. (1996), “Causes and consequences of earnings 
management: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by SEC”, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No 1, pp. 1-36. 
Dedman, E. and Lennox, C. (2007), “Managers’ perceptions of product market competition, 
profitability and firms’ voluntary disclosures of sales”, Working paper, Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology. Available at : 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237718860 (Accessed 2 July 2015). 
Dedman, E., Kausar, A., and Lennox C. (2014), “The Demand for Audit in Private Firms: 
Recent Large-Sample Evidence from the UK”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 23 
No. 1, pp. 1-23.  
DeFond, M.L. (1992), “The Association Between Changes in Client Firm Agency Costs and 
Auditor Switching”, A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 16-31. 
Demirkan, S., Radhakrishnan, S., and Urcan, O. (2011) Discretionary accruals quality, cost of 
capital, and diversification, Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance. 
forthcoming. doi:10.1177/ 0148558X11409162. 
Dey, R.M., Hoi, C.K., and Robin, A. (2011), “Family Firms and Auditor Choice: A Focus on 
IPO Firms”, Corporate Finance: Governance, Corporate Control & Organization 
eJournal 09/2011, pp. 1-35. 
Diamond, D. (1989), “Reputation acquisition in debt markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 97 No. 4, pp. 828-862. 
Dong, N. and Zhang, J.(2008), “Does Ownership Structure Matter When CPA Deciding 
Types of Audit .Opinions”, Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, Vol.4 No.4, 
pp. 44-48. 
EC, European Commission, (2013), “2013 SBA Fact Sheet, Italy”, Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-
review/files/countries- sheets/2013/italy_en.pdf (Accessed on 4th December, 2014). 
EC, European Commission (2011), “Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance 
Framework”. Available on the internet at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0164:FIN:EN:PDF . 
Accessed (20 February 2012). 
Ecoda, The European Confederation of Directors Associations (2010), “Corporate 
Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in Europe”. Available 
on the internet at http://ecoda.org/news-details/article/guidance-on-cg-for-unlisted-
companies-in-europe/ (Accessed 19 October 2015). 
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Lennox, C.S., and Pittman, J. (2015), “External versus Internal 
Monitoring: The Importance of Multiple Large Shareholders and Families to Auditor 
Choice in Western European Firms”. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1373808. 
El-Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Lennox, C., and Pittman, J.A. (2007), “Ownership Structure, 
Agency Problems, and Auditor Choice: Evidence from Western European Firms”. 
24 
 
Available at: http://www.apjfs.org/2007/report/311_guedhami2.pdf (Accessed 22 
November 2015). 
Fama, E. and Miller, M. (1972), The Theory of Finance, New York: Holt, Rhinehart and 
Winston. 
Fama, E.F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 88, pp. 288–307. 
Fama, E.F., and Jensen, M.C. (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-325. 
Fan, J.P.H., and Wong, T.J. (2005), “Do external auditors perform a corporate governance 
role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 35-72. 
Favero CA, Giglio SW, Honorati M, and Panunzi F. (2006), “The Performance of Italian 
Family Firms”, ECGI Working Paper No. 127/2006. Available on the internet at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=918181 (Accessed 22 October 2015). 
Ferguson, A., Francis, J. and Stokes, D. (2003), “The effects of firm-wide and office-level 
industry expertise on audit pricing”, The Accounting Review (April), pp. 429–448. 
Fortin, S. and Pittman, J. (2007), “The role of auditor choice in debt pricing in private firms”, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 859-896. 
Francis, J.R., Richard, C., and Vanstraelen, A. (2009), “Assessing France’s joint audit 
requirement: are two heads better than one?”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 35-63. 
Francis, J. and Wang, D. (2008), “The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on 
Earnings Quality around the World”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 25 
No. 1, pp. 157–191. 
Francis, J., Maydew, E. and Sparks, H. (1999), “The role of Big Six auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 
pp. 17–34. 
Ge, W. and McVay, S. (2005), “The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, Accounting Horizons, 19 September, pp. 137-158. 
Godwin, M. and Freedman, J. (1993), “The statutory audit and the micro company – an 
empirical investigation”, Journal of Business Law, March, pp. 103-130 
Gul, F.A. and Tsui, J.S.L. (2001), “Free cash flow, debt monitoring, and audit pricing: 
Further evidence on the role of director equity ownership”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 71-84. 
Hail, L., Leuz, C., and Wysocki, P. (2010), “Global accounting convergence and the potential 
adoption of IFRS by the U.S. (Part I): Conceptual underpinnings and economic 
analysis”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 355-394. 
Hay, D., Knechel, W. R. and Wong, N. (2006), “Audit fees: A meta-analysis of the effect of 
supply and demand attributes”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 23, Spring, 
pp. 141-192. 
Hay, D. and Davis, D. (2004), “The voluntary choice of an auditor of any level of quality”, 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 37–53. 
Hu, Y. and Izumida, S. (2008), “Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance: A 
Causal Analysis .with Japanese Panel Data”, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 342-358. 
Jaggi, B., Leung S. and Gul, F. (2009), “Family Control, Board Independence and Earnings 
Management: evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms”, Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 281-300. 
25 
 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), “Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3(October), pp. 305-
360. 
Karim, A., Van Zijl, T. and Mollah, S. (2013), “Impact of board ownership, CEO-Chair 
duality and foreign equity participation on auditor quality choice of IPO companies: 
evidence from an emerging market”, International Journal of Accounting and 
Information Management, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp.148-169. 
Kinney, J. and McDaniel, L. (1989), “Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported 
quarterly earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 71-93. 
Knechel, R., Niemi, L. and Sundgren, S. (2008), “Determinants of Auditor Choice: Evidence 
from a Small Client Market”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 12, pp. 65-88. 
Knechel, W. (2002), “The role of the independent accountant in effective risk management”, 
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, Vol. 11, pp. 65-86. 
Krishnan, G.V. (2003), “Does Big-6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings 
management?”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 17, pp. 1-16. 
Iacovone, D. (2015), “Imprese e familiari in crescita nel mondo” [Family businesses growing 
in the world], in Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 Febbraio. 
ICG (2011), Institute for Corporate Governance, Contribution to Public Consultation on 
Green Paper, The EU Corporate governance Framework COM (2011) 164 Final, 
available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB
8QFjAAahUKEwjgjOqPwbHIAhWCzxoKHYo_A9w&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.euro
pa.eu%2Finternal_market%2Fconsultations%2F2011%2Fcorporate-governance-
framework%2Fregistered-organisations%2Fistituto-per-il-governo-
societario_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFY9Kok0JLAQr6mKLjqI9kA6_urzA&sig2=1gCD
QC1WxwlqzRPNCX9MAA (Accessed 17 June 2015). 
Italian Stock Exchange, (2014), Review dei mercati 2014 [2014 Market Review], Available 
on the internet at http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/ufficio-stampa/comunicati-
stampa/2014/review2014.htm (Accessed 7 May 2015). 
La Rocca, M. and Montalto, F. (2012), “Ownership concentration and corporate 
performance: the Italian case”. Available on the internet at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CE
wQFjAHahUKEwi-
n7C19NXIAhVBXRQKHepTARY&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mfsociety.org%2F
modules%2FmodDashboard%2FuploadFiles%2Fconferences%2FMC19~504~p16p5
v1bf117u0b091ifu16242mn4.pdf&usg=AFQjCNE6FCLMWfMFu545Qui4ROaGpR
KJhw&sig2=ouDtRAYQA48Q-xVfFaKfpA&cad=rja (Accessed 18 July 2015). 
Lee, P., Stokes, D., Taylor, S., and Walter, T. (2003), “The Association Between Audit 
Quality, Accounting Disclosures and Firm-Specific Risk: Evidence from Initial Public 
Offerings”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 377–406. 
Lennox, C. (2005), “Management Ownership and Audit Firm Size”, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 205-227. 
Lin, Z. and Liu, M. (2009), “The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: evidence 
from China”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 18, 
pp. 44-59. 
Liu, C.L., and Lai, S.M. (2012), “Organizational Complexity and Auditor Quality”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review,  Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 352-368. 
Mahdavi, G., Monfared Maharlouie, M., Ebrahimi, F. and Sarikhani, M. (2011), “The Impact 
of Corporate Governance on Auditor Choice”, International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 129–139.  
26 
 
Mansi, S., Maxwell, W. and Miller, D. (2004), “Does auditor quality and tenure matter to 
investors? evidence from the bond market”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42 
No. 4, pp. 755-794. 
Mariani, L., Tettamanzi, P. and Corno, F. (2010), “External Auditing vs Statutory Committee 
Auditing: the Italian Evidence”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 14 pp. 25-40. 
Melis, A. (2004), “On the Role of the Board of Statutory Auditors in Italian Listed 
Companies”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 74–84. 
Mengoli, S., Pazzaglia, F., and Sapienza, E. (2009), “Effect of governance reforms on 
corporate ownership in Italy: Is it still pizza, spaghetti and mandolino?”, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 629-645. 
Morck, R., and Yeung, B. (2004), “Family control and the rent-seeking society”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 391-409. 
Nagar, V., Petroni, K., and Wolfenzon, D. (2011), “Governance problems in closely held 
corporations”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 
943-966. 
Newton, J. and Ashton, R. (1989), “The association between audit report technology and 
audit delay”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 8 (Suppl.), pp. 22-37. 
Niskanen, M., Karjalainen, J. and Niskanen, J. (2011), “Demand for Audit Quality in Private 
Firms: Evidence on Ownership Effects”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15, 
pp. 43-65. 
Niskanen, M., Karjalainen, J., and Steijvers, T. (2011), “Audit Quality: The Role of Board 
Structure in Family Firms”. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937511 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937511. 
Niskanen, M., Karjalainen, J., and Niskanen, J. (2010), “The role of auditing in small private 
family firms: is it about quality and credibility?”, Family Business Review, Vol. 23 
No. 3, pp. 230-245. 
OEC, Ordes Des Experte Comptables (France), National Conseil of Italian Chartered 
Accountants (Italy), and Economistas – Consejo General (2010), “Independent 
Professional Supervisory Board”. Available on the internet at 
http://economistas.org/gestor/personal/upload/noticias/DOC%20TRILATERAL%201
00410%20ENG%20ESP%20FRA%20ITA.pdf. Accessed (3 September 2015). 
OECD (2015), “Principles of Corporate Governance”, available on the internet at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm (Accessed 19 
October 2015). 
OECD (2004), “Principles of Corporate Governance”, available on the internet at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCI
QFjAAahUKEwj3laak9M7IAhVIvhQKHW9hB2Q&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oec
d.org%2Fcorporate%2Fca%2Fcorporategovernanceprinciples%2F31557724.pdf&usg
=AFQjCNF9GEZCyJUoFWOYQf-Sdv 
Wmx1PYg&sig2=1sATbDjOKhuDvGxR41n76Q (Accessed 19 October 2015). 
Osservatorio AUB (2014), “6° Osservatorio AUB sulle aziende familiari italiane” [The 6th 
AUB Observatory on Italian family firms]” Bocconi University. Available at 
http://www.aidaf.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Osservatorio-AUB-6edizionepdf.pdf 
(Accessed 17 March 2015) 
Peasnell, K., Pope P. and Young, S. (2000), “Accrual management to meet earnings targets: 
UK evidence preand post-Cadbury”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 32 No. 4, 
pp. 415-445. 
Peek, E., Cuijpers, R. and Buijink, W. (2010), “Creditors’ and Shareholders’ Reporting 
Demands in Public Versus Private Firms: evidence from Europe”, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 49-91. 
27 
 
Piot, C. (2005), “Auditor Reputation and Model of Governance: a Comparison of France, 
Germany and Canada”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 9, pp. 21-44. 
Pittman, J. A., and Fortin, S. (2004), Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly 
public firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 No. 1, pp. 113-136. 
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1998), “Financial dependence and growth”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 88 No. 3, pp. 559-586. 
Rogers, J.L., and Stocken, P.C. (2005), “Credibility of Management Forecasts”, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 4, pp. 1233-1260. 
Simunic, D. (1980), “The pricing of audit services: theory and evidence”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 161-190. 
Simunic, D. and Stein, M. (1987), “Product Differentiation in Auditing: Auditor Choice in 
the Market for Unseasoned New Issues”, The Canadian Certified General 
Accountants’ Research Foundation Vancouver, BC. 
Steijvers, T., Voordeckers, W., and Vanhoof, K. (2010), “Collateral, relationship lending and 
family firms”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 243-259. 
Stice, J. (1991), “Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors 
associated with lawsuits against auditors”, The Accounting Review, Vol 66 No. 3, pp. 
516–534. 
Van Tendeloo, B., and Vanstraelen, A. (2008), “Earnings management and audit quality in 
Europe: evidence from the private client segment market”, The European Accounting 
Review, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 447–469. 
Van Zijl, T. and Karim, A. (2010), “Clients’ Corporate Governance Characteristics and 
Auditor Choice in Emerging Audit Services Markets: The Case of Bangladesh” 
Available on the internet at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1613453 (Accessed 30 April 
2012). 
Villalonga, B., and Amit, R. (2006), “How do family ownership, control, and management 
affect firm value?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80, pp. 385-417. 
Vinciguerra R., and Cipullo N. (2009), “The economic and financial communications for 
SMEs from the point of view of accounting professionals: an empirical investigation”, 
Financial Reporting, Vol. 1, pp. 39-78. 
Wallace, W. (1987), “The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets: A 
review”, Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 1, pp. 1-34. 
Wang D. (2006), “Founding family ownership and earnings quality”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 44, pp. 619-656. 
Watts, R. and Zimmerman, J. (1986), Positive Accounting Theory, NewYork: Prenctice-Hall. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W. and DaDalt, P. (2003), “Earnings management and corporate 
governance: the roles of the board and the audit committee”, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 9, pp. 295-316. 
Zanardi S. (2010), “Il Collegio sindacale a caccia di maggiori spazi in Europa” [The Board of 
Statutory Auditors on the hunt for more space in Europe], Il Sole 24 Ore, 16 April 
2010, p. 35. 
Zarzeski, M. (1996), “Spontaneous harmonization effects of culture and market forces on 
accounting disclosure practises”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 18-37. 
  
28 
 
Table 1. Auditing bodies and the Italian “traditional” corporate governance model 
 
Model  Type of company/legal form Administrative audit Financial audit 
Traditional 
Listed 
Board of Statutory 
Auditors (BSA) 
Auditing company (AC) 
Non-listed Type 1 */PC and LlC Single auditor (SA) or AC 
Non-listed Type 2**/PC 1) SA or AC, or 2) BSAa  (art. 2409-bis) 
Non-listed Type 2**/Llc 1) BSA or 2) SA or ACa (art. 2477) 
a If allowed by a company’s by-laws 
*   Type 1: firms of public interest which are obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements 
** Type 2: firms that do not have public accountability, and are not obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements 
PC = stock or public company; Llc = limited liabilitity company 
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Table 2. The sample size and auditing system adopted by Italian non-listed firms  
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by legal form (with the relevant articles of the Italian Civil Code in brackets) 
 
Legal form of the firm (Italian Civil Code) 
N. %     
 
Stock companies (Art. 2325-2451) 
 
108 28.12     
Limited liabilities firms (Art. 2462-2483) 276 71.88     
Total 384 100  
 
 
  
Panel B: Sample distribution by type of auditors      
 
Type of auditor 
/Legal form of the firm 
Stock companies 
Limited liability 
firms 
Total sample 
 
Non-listed firms audited by the: 
N. % N. % N. % 
 
Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA) 
 
62 21.83 222 78.17 284 73.96 
External auditor 46 46.00 54 54.00 100 26.04 
 
Total 
108 28.12 276 71.88 384 100 
Panel C: Sample distribution by Legal form      
 
Legal form 
/Type of auditor 
External Auditor BSA Total sample 
 
Non-listed firms audited by the: 
N. % N. % N. % 
 
Stock companies 
 
46 42,59 62 57,41 108 100.00 
Limited liability firms 54 19.57 222 80.43 276 100.00 
 
Total 
100 26.00 284 74.00 384 100 
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Table 3. Variable measurement 
 
Independent 
variable 
Variable description 
Expected 
sign 
Hypothesis 
OWN Family ownership concentration, proxied by family control and closely held 
ownership (1 = at least 50% of voting rights or outstanding shares held by a 
family block holder; 0  = otherwise). 
– H1a 
FOWN Degree of foreign ownership (1 = firm has at least one foreign shareholder; 0 = 
otherwise). 
+ H1b 
BOARD Degree of manager independence, i.e. proportion of independent managers on the 
Board (1 = at least 50% of managers are independent; 0 = otherwise). 
+/– H1c 
FSALES Foreign revenues, i.e. proportion of sales which are international (outside sales 
divided by total sales). 
+ H2 
LEV Leverage ratio, i.e. debt to banks, other capital providers, and bondholders scaled 
by total assets. 
+ H3 
APGROW Trade credit or accounts payable, i.e. total accounts payable scaled by total assets. + H3 
SIZE Measure of asset and operational complexity, i.e. natural logarithm of total assets. + H4a 
SALARY Salaries, i.e. salaries paid scaled by total operating expenses. – H4b 
COMPLEX Firm organizational complexity, i.e. sum of tangible, intangible, financial assets, 
and inventories scaled by total assets. 
– H4b 
GROUP Subsidiary status dummy (1 = firm is a subsidiary; 0 = otherwise). + H4c 
INV Inventories, i.e. inventories scaled by total assets. – H4d 
REC Receivables, i.e. stock of receivables scaled by total assets. – H4d 
CASH Cash and cash equivalents, i.e. stock of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total 
assets. 
– H4d 
SALEGROW Revenue growth rate, i.e. relative change in revenues. – H4d 
AGE Firm age, i.e. natural log of firm years of establishment. – H4e 
ROA Firm profitability, i.e. return on assets. – – 
LEGFORM Legal form, i.e. incorporation status dummy (1 = firm incorporated as stock 
company; 0 = otherwise).  
+ – 
IFRS Voluntary adoption of full IAS/IFRS in financial statements, i.e. dummy (1 = firm 
complies with IAS/IFRS; 0 = otherwise). 
+ – 
NAT Parent company nationality dummy (1 = foreign parent company; 0 = otherwise). + – 
IND Industry dummy (1 = SIC code 2/3 manufacturer; 0 = otherwise).  n/a – 
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Table 4. Dummy variable descriptive by auditor type 
 
 
 
Dichotomous variables (sample N= 384) 
 
 
Panel A: 
Audited by a BSA (N= 284) 
 
PANEL B: 
Audited by an external auditor (N=100) 
 0 1 0 1 
Variable Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
OWN 103 36.3 181 63.7 82 82.0 18 18.0 
FOWN 255 89.8 29 10.2 55 55.0 45 45.0 
BOARD 187 65.8 97 34.2 18 18.0 82 82.0 
GROUP 193 68.0 91 32.0 22 22.0 78 78.0 
LEGFORM 222 78.2 62 21.8 54 54.0 46 46.0 
IND 98 34.5 186 65.5 34 34.0 66 66.0 
NAT 255 89.8 29 10.2 58 58 42 42 
IFRS 283 99.6 1 0.4 95 95 5 5 
 
 
 
Table 5. Continuous variable descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Firms engaging a BSA (N=284) Panel B: Firms engaging an external auditor (N=100) 
Variable Mean S.E. Median S.D. Min. Max. Variable Mean S.E. Median S.D. Min. Max. 
FSALES 0.106 0.013 0.000 0.219 0.00 1.00 FSALES 0.101 0.023 0.000 0.226 0.00 1.00 
LEV 0.139 0.011 0.025 0.183 0.00 0.68 LEV 0.176 0.020 0.090 0.199 0.00 0.73 
APGROW 0.074 0.042 -0.040 0.708 -0.77 8.43 APGROW -0.011 0.038 -0.020 0.385 -0.87 1.31 
SALARY 0.172 0.008 0.140 0.128 0.00 0.83 SALARY 0.179 0.012 0.160 0.122 0.00 0.57 
COMPLEX 0.497 0.014 0.500 0.231 0.00 0.99 COMPLEX 0.414 0.024 0.430 0.243 0.01 0.96 
SIZE 9.678 0.055 9.580 0.930 7.13 12.54 SIZE 10.47 0.138 10.255 1.382 7.81 13.98 
INV 0.350 0.058 0.103 0.986 0.00 9.39 INV 0.059 0.202 0.156 2.020 0.00 14.01 
REC 0.678 0.080 0.358 1.346 0.000 14.20 REC 0.621 0.128 0.308 1.280 0.00 10.84 
CASH 0.062 0.006 0.017 0.098 -0.02 0.61 CASH 0.062 0.009 0.026 0.919 0.00 0.64 
AGE 3.086 0.045 3.220 0.762 0.69 4.64 AGE 3.015 0.091 3.178 0.910 0.69 4.64 
SALEGROW 0.044 0.011 0.100 0.192 -0.63 2.41 SALEGROW 0.023 0.146 0.010 0.146 -0.71 0.63 
ROA 2.973 0.435 2.610 7.336 -44.34 43.61 ROA 3.815 1.009 2.710 10.087 -23.55 34.11 
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Table 6. Correlation matrix for the model variables 
 AUDIT OWN FOWN BOARD FSALES LEV APGROW 
SALE 
GROW 
SALARY COMPLEX  SIZE  GROUP  
INV REC CASH 
AGE IFRS NAT ROA 
LEG 
FORM 
IND 
AUDIT 1.000 -.402** .387** .421** .001 .086 .004 .012 .034 -.147** .260** .406** .059 -.039 .089 -.036 .164** .359** .033 .236** .005 
  .000 .000 .000 .984 .091 .945 .814 .510 .004 .000 .000 .249 .450 .081 .481 .001 .000 .514 .000 .927 
OWN -.402** 1 -.427** -.760** .086 -.109* -.022 .060 -.024 .115* -.261** -.615** -.038 -.014 .005 .022 -.089 -.319** .048 -.255** -.028 
 .000  .000 .000 .094 .032 .668 .240 .633 .024 .000 .000 .455 .783 .916 .671 .083 .000 .346 .000 .578 
FOWN .387** -.427** 1 .404** .058 .046 -.079 -.028 .012 -.153** .176** .498** .056 -.080 .001 -.018 .151** .737** -.017 .150** -.036 
 .000 .000   .000 .253 .365 .121 .584 .814 .003 .001 .000 .276 .118 .983 .732 .003 .000 .740 .003 .486 
BOARD .421** -.760** .404** 1 -.018 .021 .007 -.074 -.011 -.082 .272** .528** .033 -.040 .013 -.007 .093 .348** -.054 .263** .006 
 .000 .000 .000   .727 .685 .896 .149 .824 .108 .000 .000 .524 .433 .798 .884 .069 .000 .290 .000 .909 
FSALES -.010 .108* .029 -.048 1 .009 -.033 .037 .039 .103* .104* -.027 .047 .016 .002 -.057 .024 .027 .047 .118* .014 
 .847 .034 .573 .347   .859 .518 .470 .448 .044 .041 .602 .354 .756 .972 .265 .645 .593 .359 .021 .789 
LEV .086 -.102* .047 .024 -.022 1 -.054 -.030 .052 .078 -.006 .120* .048 -.093 -.175** -.053 .053 -.015 -.092 .064 -.030 
 .094 .045 .361 .633 .672   .289 .555 .314 .129 .909 .019 .345 .069 .001 .297 .299 .775 .071 .210 .564 
APGROW -.058 -.035 -.063 -.022 -.055 -.046 1 .056 .023 .042 .130* .014 -.041 -.017 -.085 .027 -.129* -.073 .026 .015 -.037 
 .253 .497 .220 .674 .283 .369   .276 .648 .414 .011 .783 .424 .745 .097 .594 .012 .153 .614 .764 .474 
SALEGROW -.051 -.007 .026 -.048 -.038 -.033 .122* 1 .121* .002 -.082 -.054 .055 .013 .042 .064 -.004 -.012 -.075 .096 .038 
 .319 .892 .614 .349 .457 .523 .017   .018 .967 .107 .287 .284 .801 .414 .213 .938 .816 .144 .060 .461 
SALARY .025 -.017 .004 -.032 .021 .021 -.022 .049 1 .197** -.084 .044 -.011 -.056 .038 .013 .008 .008 -.068 -.037 .095 
 .626 .738 .940 .527 .683 .685 .667 .339   .000 .100 .390 .826 .276 .455 .799 .869 .875 .186 .464 .063 
COMPLEX -.154** .123* -.152** -.092 .102* .087 -.045 .033 .121* 1 .199** -.116* .050 -.085 .016 .017 -.058 -.093 -.205** -.066 .202** 
 .003 .016 .003 .072 .047 .090 .383 .522 .018   .000 .023 .326 .097 .756 .740 .259 .068 .000 .195 .000 
SIZE .309** -.260** .207** .280** .021 .050 .044 -.098 -.118* .218** 1 .228** .062 .041 .020 -.008 .024 .216** .030 .263** .132** 
 .000 .000 .000 .000 .677 .331 .393 .055 .021 .000   .000 .222 .421 .693 .869 .638 .000 .556 .000 .009 
GROUP .406** -.615** .498** .528** -.028 .134** .049 .012 .034 -.124* .230** 1 .015 -.048 -.034 -.050 .058 .456** -.025 .227** -.021 
 .000 .000 .000 .000 .588 .009 .337 .811 .504 .015 .000   .772 .346 .503 .332 .261 .000 .631 .000 .681 
INV .079 .014 .041 .008 -.040 -.114* -.044 -.015 .001 -.036 .031 -.016 1 .294** -.014 .094 -.006 .041 -.070 -.044 -.010 
 .123 .783 .421 .876 .432 .026 .390 .777 .988 .487 .551 .753   .000 .781 .066 .903 .424 .174 .385 .845 
REC -.019 -.012 .050 -.017 -.064 -.121* .001 -.017 -.023 -.055 .040 -.034 .640** 1 .111* -.111* .015 -.056 .011 -.036 .041 
 .716 .818 .331 .737 .214 .017 .986 .744 .660 .279 .435 .503 .000  .029 .030 .774 .277 .837 .482 .418 
CASH .002 .009 -.033 .003 -.014 -.249** -.069 -.018 -.041 .031 .014 -.027 -.076 -.016 1 -.065 -.030 .004 .030 .001 .052 
 .974 .862 .515 .950 .783 .000 .178 .723 .427 .539 .788 .599 .135 .759   .200 .563 .941 .563 .988 .306 
AGE -.039 .042 -.025 -.023 -.040 -.088 .024 .021 -.049 .012 -.028 -.061 .027 -.029 -.003 1 .020 -.019 -.091 -.050 .080 
 .442 .414 .626 .654 .430 .085 .637 .679 .339 .810 .578 .233 .604 .571 .947   .703 .717 .074 .324 .118 
IFRS .164** -.089 .151** .093 .078 .029 -.083 .002 -.019 -.060 .055 .058 .010 .041 -.023 .023 1 .102* .032 -.032 .047 
 .001 .083 .003 .069 .129 .571 .104 .969 .717 .241 .284 .261 .848 .419 .651 .660  .045 .530 .530 .359 
NAT .359** -.319** .737** .348** .035 -.004 -.052 .036 -.011 -.092 .261** .456** .053 .054 -.011 -.023 .102* 1 -.045 .239** -.008 
 .000 .000 .000 .000 .496 .940 .314 .486 .823 .072 .000 .000 .296 .291 .833 .657 .045  .382 .000 .870 
ROA .045 .039 .021 -.021 .101* -.118* -.211** -.055 .007 -.172** .001 .015 .005 .034 .039 -.120* .025 -.020 1 -.039 .038 
 .374 .450 .682 .678 .048 .020 .000 .283 .892 .001 .985 .776 .921 .510 .447 .018 .629 .693  .444 .460 
LEGFORM .236** -.255** .150** .263** .055 .059 .043 .070 -.068 -.064 .257** .227** -.034 -.014 -.040 -.034 -.032 .239** -.015 1 .002 
 .000 .000 .003 .000 .285 .247 .401 .172 .185 .207 .000 .000 .507 .789 .439 .508 .530 .000 .768   .976 
IND .005 -.028 -.036 .006 .041 -.034 -.036 .014 -.009 .205** .100 -.021 .046 .091 .097 .119* .047 -.008 .071 .002 1 
 .927 .578 .486 .909 .422 .507 .484 .785 .855 .000 .051 .681 .366 .075 .058 .020 .359 .870 .168 .976   
This table reports Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients for the model variables above (below) the diagonal. ** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) and * at the 5% level (2-tailed). Probabilities are shown in italics. For variable 
definitions, see Table 3.
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Table 7. A logistic regression model of auditor choice in Italian non-listed firms 
Variables  Hyp. 
Exp. 
sign 
Coefficient S.E. z p-value  
        
Constant   −7.30 1.689 −4.322 <0.000 *** 
        
a) Agency factors  
OWN H1a – −0.320 0.508 −0.6319 0.528  
FOWN H1b + 0.475 0.478 0.994 0.320  
BOARD H1c +/- 1.012 0.461 2.192 0.028 ** 
FSALES H2 + −0.151 0.749 −0.201 0.840  
LEV H3 + 0.980 0.825 1.188 0.235  
APGROW H3 + −0.222 0.328 −0.677 0.498  
        
b) Organizational complexity and risk factors 
SIZE H4a + 0.523 0.148 3.524 0.000 *** 
SALARY H4b – 1.854 1.165 1.591 0.111  
COMPLEX H4b – −2.046 0.724 −2.826 0.005 *** 
GROUP H4c + 0.821 0.388 2.118 0.034 ** 
INV H4d – 0.373 0.175 2.133 0.033 ** 
REC H4d – −0.369 0.219 −1.684 0.092 * 
CASH H4d – 1.637 1.618 1.012 0.312  
SALEGROW H4d – −0.485 0.741 −0.655 0.512  
AGE H4e – −0.021 0.180 −0.115 0.908  
        
c) Control variables        
ROA  - 0.009 0.017 0.536 0.592  
LEGFORM  + 0.543 0.321 1.693 0.090 * 
IFRS  + 2.447 1.235 1.981 0.048 ** 
NAT  + 0.238 0.490 0.486 0.627  
IND  n/a 0.215 0.331 0.651 0.515  
        
Model diagnostics:        
-2 Log likelihood: −149.237        
Adj. R-Squared: 22.70%; R-Square McFadden: 32.23%     
This table presents the results of a logistic regression model of the likelihood that non-listed firms engage an external auditor as opposed to a 
BSA. The model includes observations for the year 2009. For variable definitions please see Table 3.*, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
